Tuesday, April 9, 2019

Intuitive Social Integration

Intuitive Social Integration
Part I: Feelings
The present approach to feelings - maybe unique to US culture, maybe worldwide (I can't know) seems to be that feelings are to be feared. They must be wrestled into submission, gagged through tricks, or given the reigns to take over the body as an entity of their own, so one can somehow distance oneself from the shame of associating with them, as perhaps from a toxic relative.
Being taught to "deal with" emotions, especially as children, teaches that feelings are essentially negative and, thus, threats. But i impress that denying one's feelings is denying one's very self and immediately produces discord within oneself.
Feelings are the primary form of communication used by one's true self to gain attention, and when confronted with care and thoroughness, promise a freedom by discovering and rejoining that true self. The people or things or circumstances which trigger the emotions are often seen as the answer to the emotions, but they are merely external mirrors of the message. They can provide clarity to the message in a new way. Unfortunately, they often provide further distraction, prolonging the discord. One must fearlessly identify the trigger, take pause to look inward at the feeling and then dig DEEP for that lost piece using the aforementioned clues. Only then is the true beauty and appreciation of the power and utility of feelings, and accordingly what it means to be human, found.
In summary, listen to your feelings: they are essential to being. But do so with enough time and care get the full message, which could be older than originally thought
Part II: Love and Sexuality
I think this subject is another which our culture gets very, very wrong; and, yet again, the teaching is fear. Children are taught to closely guard their hearts and that sexuality (which at a young age is symbolized by part of their very own, innocent bodies) is bad. This leads to strong paranoia and fear of each person as somehow having the power to steal something personal, and fear of not controlling oneself and damaging oneself permanently through using the wrong type of sexuality.
Sexuality and practicing one's passions are part of one's identity. How and when they are experienced is as unique as each person. I am providing my own definition of sexuality: a broader, misleading, term to describe the sensation of oneness with a people - be it through a shared passion, representing a missing part of oneself, or when loving them. The normal assumption is that a person who sparks the feelings of sexuality is someone to be feared (cut-off) or contained (obtained) in order to gain control of the feelings, lest they cause a lack of control of actions and accidental sex.
Sometimes a shared passion prompting that oneness isn't immediately recognized, or an existing disharmony within oneself will make the attraction all the more veiled. I suspect additionally that some who have a passion involving people, have the hardest time being understood and accepting their own sexuality, because they don't enjoy the luxury that is having context to separate the sexuality from passion for people. For example someone who is passionate about music will feel that same thrill as someone who is passionate about people, but they don't understand each other and thus cannot discern that they are the same. Perhaps the person passionate about people receives shaming for acting with passion towards people, links the passion with sex and yields lots of confusion all around. If there is an added level of disharmony in oneself, the stronger and longer that part of this self has been rejected, the stronger the self will be drawn to someone who points to the oneness sought in one's self. This is not sexuality as a passion, but something else entirely. This breeds dependency on the person to act in place of the rejected part, permanently, or at least until that rejected piece is recovered.
None of this is love (Hahaha). Just as a musician does not truly love the piano which is the vehicle of their passion, so does someone who experiences their sexuality with other people, not automatically love those people. Love is a choice to open one's ears to another's needs and give to them. It is a VERY broad spectrum, but always a choice. Also, the more one decides to love, the more one develops a passion to love, and the more love becomes available for one to give. It's a fascinating thing. But where I think this culture goes wrong is the emphasis that one should only love one person, or worse, depicting as love what is actually sexuality. To be clear, choosing a companion should be choosing to love that person MOST, in that their needs are put ahead of one's own and everyone else's. What's been lost, I speculate with the advent of high speed transportation as well as the world wars, has been loving each other as part of a community. The effects have been disastrous and, I believe, can be blamed for so much of the current, confusing tragedies. It's become commonplace to keep distance and deafen to the needs of others. Different versions of the mantra "do what works for you" are a useful to begin accepting oneself, but they cannot solve the destructive crisis of the lack of love. The mantras wouldn't be necessary if the love from the community were present and felt. I think this is where there is so much opportunity for change. What if each person tried to love EVERYONE RADICALLY: not being afraid of using the word "love", not being afraid to show affection, not being afraid to express appreciation for each person's uniqueness, not being afraid let someone else shine, not being afraid to accommodate, not being afraid to sacrifice some tears, not being afraid of being hurt. When one rejects fear, the world opens up.
In summary, sexuality is a sensation of oneness, and not something to fear. Love is a choice and should be practiced as lavishly as possible.

Monday, April 8, 2019

Of First, Second and Third Order Philosophy

Introduction


With the rise of rival methodologies for the acquisition of knowledge, especially the natural sciences, philosophy in the 21st century is forced, more than ever, to justify its merits as a valid way to reach the truth about man and its surroundings. As such, it is important to look at the ways in which philosophy is conducted and in which way it still contributes to the enhancement of our understanding of the world.

In this present essay I do not seek to provide a thorough clarification on that matter but rather my intention is to focus on a quite specific issue that is part of the general debate mentioned above. Namely, the purpose of this essay is to separate what I will call the original ideas of Philosophy from the remainder of the body of work that constitutes philosophical production. It is my belief that those original ideas of philosophy are in fact the type of philosophy that drives human knowledge further and constitutes the core of philosophy's importance in the world of the 21st century.

I propose that a division should be made then between three different kinds of philosophical ideas or works. The first kind concerns the great works of philosophy that propose original ideas and thus move philosophical inquiry forward. The second type concerns all types of replies, commentaries or clarifications of those original works. A third kind is composed of an infinity of academic commentaries that dissect the knowledge exposed in the first two kinds of works of philosophy.

Works of the First Order


Works of the first order are those that concern original ideas and legitimately advance the scope, depth and accuracy of the pursuit of knowledge. In fact, as the very name of philosophy indicates (in Greek philosophia means love of wisdom), the very existence of philosophy, since its beginning, was to pursue forms of wisdom, knowledge and truth. As such, those original works which aim at providing the answers to the great questions, compose the foundation for the discipline of philosophy.

Going back to the very beginning of the discipline, we can identify the original works that laid down its foundations, such as those produced by Thales of Miletus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle or Epicurus. Those first philosophers were concerned with finding convincing answers to the fundamental questions posed to us by our very existence and nature such as "where did we come from?" ; "who created the world "; "What is the meaning of life?" ;, "what is the essence of morality"; ; "what is knowledge and how can we acquire it?"; The works of the first philosophers had the purpose of answering these and other questions about man and its surroundings and were the foundational stones for philosophy and human, or at least western rational beliefs.

In the same vein, other great thinkers throughout the history of humanity have continued to produce great original ideas as forms to answer the great questions concerning knowledge about the man and the universe. Many of those thinkers added their contribution to the field of philosophy, others to science, some to both and a few have given birth to other disciplines of knowledge of a more specific nature such as economics or psychology.

What identifies the philosophical works of the first order is that they constitute original responses to fundamental questions about the nature of man and the universe that surrounds him. This is definitely a chief characteristic found in the works of the great philosophers, yet it is also found in the works of the greatest modern philosophers. In Political Philosophy, for instance, Niccolo Machiavelli put forward, in his seminal work The Prince, original notions about how a ruler should govern his people that had not been present in the same way in any works up to that point. Even though the Greek masters had previously offered models for optimal governance in works such as Plato's The Republic; and Aristotle's Politics, none had quite arrived at the same answers as those presented in Machiavelli's work.

In a similar fashion, in his magnum ops Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes offered an alternative perspective on the nature of government and what a ruler should be like and how he should be perceived by the ruled. In the following century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract would build on some of the notions put forward by Hobbes yet subvert them in order to create an opposing view of the state by arguing that the institutions deemed vital by Hobbes were in fact responsible for the oppression of men and women in society. Almost one century after that, Marx and Engels published their Communist Manifesto, offering yet another distinct interpretation of how societies should be structured and governed and about the duties and rights of those who are governed and those who govern them. All of these works were original ideas conceived to answer the fundamental questions about how societies should be structured and governed.

All of those great thinkers, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau and Marx can thus be considered to have produced philosophical works of the first order in the branch of political philosophy. Many other thinkers throughout the ages have produced similar works of the first order in this field by presenting their own, unique and novel explanations of the political phenomenon. Each of those original works has contributed to enrich our knowledge of politics, just as each original work on ethics or metaphysics has contributed to enrich our cumulative knowledge on those fields.

Of course, not all works of the first order are necessarily right. Some of them contain mistakes that compromise the theories either partially or totally. Some of those mistakes only become apparent due to its practical consequences. For example, the atrocities committed by communist governments in many countries in the world have certainly compromised the notion of communism as an Utopian society as put forward in the works of Marx and Engels. In a different way, many of the theories espoused by the Greek philosophers in the fields of epistemology and especially metaphysics have later been disproved by the advancements of the natural sciences.

Nonetheless, it is not the purpose of this essay to prove that all works of first order in philosophy are right or infallible. In philosophy, as in science or mathematics, not all theories are correct. Many theories are eventually proven incorrect and sooner or later replaced by newer, often better, theories. The quest for truth is not linear, but a succession of educated guesses. I do intend to assert, nevertheless, that the key works of philosophy are, almost without exception, the ones that I have described as those of first order. Yet, even works of second order are of utility to philosophy as I wish to propose next.

Works of the Second Order


Although philosophy is driven forward by primarily works of the first order, most works of philosophy are of a different nature. Most of the philosophical production throughout history as well as in our time is actually composed of works of second order or below. If works of the first order consist of original answers to fundamental questions concerning humans and their surroundings, works of the second order consist of responses and commentaries of those great works. While works of the first order carry the ambition of answering directly to the great questions posed by humanity, the philosophical works of the second order do so only indirectly. Instead, their focus is on the ideas first exposed by other philosophers.

It could then be said that whilst the object of study of works of the first order is the nature of man and the universe, the object of study of works of the second order is philosophy itself or, in other words, the body of philosophical knowledge previously established by works of the first order. Works of the first order are independent, whereas works of the second order exist in relation to works of the first order.

Works of the second order can broadly be fit into three major categories. They are sometimes replies or criticisms to original ideas. Other times, they seek to expand upon a particular idea laid out in a work of the first order by another philosopher. And sometimes works of the second order seek to clarify the contents contained in works of the first order. No matter what type, however, or indeed its level of sophistication, these secondary works always have a previous work as their object of study, and cannot be fully grasped without some knowledge of a previous work.

After having defined and categorized philosophical works of the second order, I would now like to discuss their value and purpose. After all if, as I suspect, there are many more works of the second order than works of the first order in existence, one would certainly expect works of the second order to bring a great deal of added value to philosophy. If this weren't the case, why would so many philosophers decide to produce works of the second order instead of focusing on the production of works of the first order?

Perhaps the best answer to that question are contained in the three categories of second order philosophical works I have established. For example, a second order philosophical work that constitutes a response, criticism or refutation is intended to essentially assess the validity of an original idea. This has considerable value since these types of work are essential if we are able to determine which theories contained in works of first order are true and which ones are false. These types of secondary works are then essential to philosophy insofar as they essentially filer ideas by allowing us to keep the good ideas and discard the bad.

A second category of works of second order is concerned with expanding the original ideas contained in works of the first order. These works can be extremely valuable to philosophy since they perfect and enlarge the theories of knowledge proposed by the original works.

The third category of works of the second order is also valuable, although perhaps somewhat less so. Its main focus is to clarify the somewhat obscure, confusing or incoherent ideas presented in works of the first order. Although these works don't necessarily change the knowledge contained in the works they are subordinate to, they refine that knowledge making it easier to discuss, understand and disseminate.

In fact, a close look at most modern libraries' philosophy sections, may they be private, public or academic would probably reveal somewhat of an imbalance between the volume of works of the first order and the works of the second order. It would seem that, in some ways, the original works of the great philosophers of the past have become almost like the sacred scriptures in the sense that they are accessed by readers not directly but indirectly. Just like most Sunday mass attendees are willing to receive the biblical messages from the mouths of an intermediary in the figure of a priest, most students of philosophy often learn the theories of the great thinkers not by reading their original works, but by listening to the lectures at University, watching documentaries or reading books written by modern philosophy scholars that clarify, classify and often simplify the original works, making them more palatable for modern audiences.

This process of clarification accomplishes the mission of perpetuating the original messages contained in the works where they first appeared. What it does not do, however, is advance philosophy as a whole by answering the questions that philosophy proposes to answer. These philosophical works do not create knowledge nor is that their purpose or intention. Their function is simply to catalog and disseminate the knowledge that was created by the works of the first order they are subordinate to.

In this sense, a philosophical work of the first order could be compared to an original novel such as The Old Man and the Sea by Ernest Hemingway, whereas a philosophical work of the second order can be compared, in the same analogy, to a book that criticizes or analyzes The Old Man and the Sea or Hemingway's body of work. In a work of the first order, in philosophy or literature, the author is seeking to produce an original work that expands the content and boundaries of his or her field. In a work of the second order, the author is focused on dissecting the accomplishments or shortcomings of the first author and his works.

Works of the Third Order

In reality, it is possible, and even necessary, to introduce a third category to complete this theory of metaphilosophy, since not all works can be considered works of first or second order. Some, I wish to argue, can only be described as works of the third order.

As we've seen, works of the first order are those that try to directly answer some of the fundamental questions about humans and the universe. Questions such as Where do we come from? ; Who created the universe?;Is there a God?; or ; How can one live life righteously? In works of the first order, philosophers use reason and experience in order to construct feasible answers to those questions and hence increase knowledge as a species.

Works of the second order, on the other hand, have different purposes. They seek to criticize, expand upon or clarify the ideas espoused in works of the first order. Unlike the former, they do not exist independently, but are instead subordinate to the existence of other works. Works of the second order can only be said to answer the fundamental questions of philosophy indirectly, as an exploration of the answers provided by the works of first order.

There are some works, however, that exist only in relation not only to works of first order, but also to works of the second order. In other words, they are commentaries or works of the second order which are themselves commentaries on works of the first order. As an example of this, consider Machiavelli's work of the first order The Prince. In his work he tries to answer the fundamental question of how should a ruler govern a state effectively and retain as much power as possible. A work of the second order could be an assessment of the ethical implications of Machiavelli's theory. In this case, an example of a work of the third order would be an essay or a book discussing the views exposed by the author of the work of second order about Machiavelli's The Prince.

The fundamental problem regarding works of the third order is that they are at least two degrees removed from the fundamental questions that drive philosophy forward and inspire philosophers to create works of the first order in the first place. One is then forced to ask how those works, twice derivative in nature, can ever hope to make a meaningful contribution to philosophy's chief goal, the pursuit of truth. I suspect that a more in depth examination of the issue would be necessary in order to provide a conclusive answer. Yet, at first glance, I believe we should strongly suspect that, the more derivative a work of philosophy is, and the more it is removed from direct contact with the fundamental questions, the less useful and meaningful it ultimately is. It follows from this that, because of their very nature, works of the second order are less useful than works of the first order, works of the third order are less useful than works of the second order and so on and so forth. We could then deduce a pattern of diminishing returns propagating itself ad infinitum; the more removed from the original questions philosophical works are.

Should we then assume that philosophical works of the third order are utterly useless and therefore a waste of the philosopher's time? Perhaps such a conclusion would be too radical and would altogether overlook the great strides made possible by the careful and multi-layered dissection of ideas produced by the careful examination of original ideas by philosophers dedicated to studying the works of other philosophers. However, even though works of the third order, especially good ones, can have considerable value in themselves they will never have the kind of originality necessary to reframe our understanding of the universe and of ourselves. For that, we must commend ourselves to works of the first order. As such, in an era when most of our philosophy is arguably produced by professional philosophers employed by philosophy departments in universities across the world, we should ask ourselves what kind of works we should want them to produce, and if their current focus on producing works of second, third or lower orders is warranted.

After all, considering that the most valuable kind of philosophy is that of high originality and close contact with the fundamental questions, it would only be logical for philosophers to focus their efforts on producing these kinds of works. Instead, it is obvious that most professional philosophers are currently primarily engaged in the production of articles and books that focus on the discussion of the works of the first order produced by well known philosophers or on the discussion of works of second order produced by their peers. In the midst of all this activity, one can argue that works of the first order, arguably the most important kind, are often overlooked.

This seemingly strange situation, almost illegal in nature, is however not only odd or unusual but instead a natural consequence of human nature and its natural repercussion in our educational systems of which universities are a part of.

Most professional philosophers are, after all, a product of said systems of education. In order to become professional philosophers, one has to take into account their gradual percourse as elementary students, middle school students, high school students, undergraduate students and lastly graduate students. During all that time they've been given the task of studying and learning from books produced by higher ranked individuals. In the study of philosophy, they've learned philosophy by studying the works of philosophers and philosophy professors. In that process, they invariably develop a great dose of reference for works of famous philosophers and their professors, and all the work they are asked to produce is of a second order at best and most likely of a third order or lower.

It is then not surprising at all that, when these lifelong students become professors themselves, their mind is molded in a way that does not favor the production of original works or works of the first order. They are instead wired for the production of derivative works anchored by the higher authority that derives from the works of first order they relate to.

The Universe of Philosophy


After having introduced the three categories of philosophical works based on the nature of their object or, in other words, their proximity to the fundamental questions about Man and the universe, I now wish to propose a vision of Philosophy as a universe of knowledge in constant mutation. Such a philosophical universe, so to speak, is in fact not so different in structure from the physical universe in which we inhabit, as I shall argue.

Let us imagine then an infinite universe composed not of space, time and matter but of ideas and their creators. Such is the Universe of Philosophy. In the physical universe planets orbit around stars thus forming planetary systems such as the Solar System. In the Universe of Philosophy the stars are the great original works of the first order and their creators. Around them, systems composed of multiple planets form, but in this case the planets are the works of second order written in function of the star works of first order. Some less well known works of the first order might only have five or ten or fifteen works of the second order orbiting around them, but other more influential works such as Machiavelli;s The Prince or Nietzsche' Thus Spoke Zarathustra will invariably have hundreds, thousands or even tens of thousands of books and articles written about them. And, just like in the physical universe the bigger planets have satellites orbiting around them, some of the more renowned works of second order will also have a number of works of the third orderaround them, which in this case means written as an exploration, critique or otherwise commentary about them.

Furthermore, just as in the physical universe stars are grouped into galaxies with supermassive black holes at their center, in the universe of philosophy the great works of first order are also often grouped together in schools, currents or approaches to a particular philosophical issue such as rationalism, empiricism, existentialism, relativism, social contract theory, scepticism, utilitarianism, communism, pragmatism or feminism.

In the physical universe, galaxies come together in groups or clusters which commonly share a gravitational center. In the philosophy universe, different schools or approaches are all part of a particular branch or field of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, or ethics, and all of those fields have commonly a central group of questions that define them. All of those clusters or groups of galaxies form the physical universe, just like all the fields of philosophy together make up the Universe of Philosophy.

Both in the physical universe and in the universe of philosophy as presented here, the stars or their analogs, the works of first order, are the main units of organization of the universe. The planets and satellites surrounding them cannot exist without them, just like works of second order and lower cannot exist without a work of first order anchoring them.

Also, the universe of philosophy, as its analog, is not fixed. Instead, it is always in motion, expanding as new stars are born or works of the first order are written, and works of lesser orders forming around them in the same way as planets and satellites form around the stars. As more stars are born the universe expands and as more works of the first order are written the more our philosophical knowledge expands. And, just as stars decay and die, so do some of our great philosophical ideas, either disproven or fallen into obscurity.

Conclusion


The defining question of metaphilosophy is What is Philosophy? In this essay, however, I tried to answer a similar yet somewhat different question, What types of Philosophy are there? In doing so, I haven't focused on the traditional division of Philosophy in terms of its branches, such as Epistemology, Metaphysics or Ethics, which concern different fundamental questions about Man and its surroundings. I also haven't focused on particular schools of Philosophical thought such as Existentialism, Pragmatism or Empiricism. Instead, I have proposed an organization of philosophical works and authors based on the proximity of these works to the fundamental questions of Philosophy. I have called the philosophical works that provide original and direct responses to philosophical problems works of first order. These works that are written in response or in relation to previous philosophical works I have labelled works of the second order. And finally, those works that have been written in function of works of the second order I have labelled works of the third order.

I believe that such a novel organization of the broad field of philosophy is important because it reveals which works are indeed  trying to expand our knowledge by answering fundamental questions directly, and those whose object is simply to discuss previous works containing those answers. I have argued that, in spite of having some value, works of second and third order do not substantially enhance our knowledge of the fundamental mysteries of the universe that Philosophy tries to unveil. Those works can be likened to literary reviews or commentaries, which albeit being of some value, cannot truly be compared to original stories, novels, poems or plays.

Whilst invariably the study of Philosophy must concern itself with the study of the works of the first order produced by the great philosophers in history such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant or Nietzsche, one should not mistaken those studies with Philosophy itself. To produce Philosophy one must put aside the crutch of citing the opinions of others and evoking well known and well proven thoughts had by others and discussed by many, and venture into the dangerous world of conceptual imagination. In essence, to produce real philosophy, one must do what works of the first order are willing to do and works of the second and third orders are not. One must be willing to think for himself or herself, no matter the consequences. That is what creating Philosophy entails.

In the world of the 21st century, more than ever, Philosophy must be capable of being true to its name. It must be a way to pursue wisdom. At a time when Science is, once again, ushering the world into a new scientific and technological revolution, the Philosopher must find his purpose and his value as a man of wisdom. In order to do this he must find the courage to abandon all crutches and expose himself to the world and all its skepticism and criticism. This is not something that can be achieved by producing Philosophy of the second, third or lower orders. This must be done by engaging directly with the great questions of our time and of eternity.

The vision I have proposed is that of a philosophical universe composed by works of the first order (stars), surrounded by subservient works of the second order (planets) and works of the third order (satellites). Both universes, the physical and the philosophical ones, are constantly expanding through the birth of new stars. It is my hope that in the decades and centuries to come we see the appearance of many and more works of the first order produced by original thinkers committed to expanding the boundaries of philosophical thought and making a name for Philosophy in the Age of Technology.


Bruno Franco Netto

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